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ABSTRACT
This article contrasts the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores on corporations’ ability to exercise
religion with relevant jurisprudence of the European Convention on
Human Rights (“ECHR”) mechanisms — the European Court of
Human Rights and the now-defunct European Commission on
Human Rights.  We seek to determine “whose right and who’s right?”
In other words, does a corporate right to exercise religion exist?  And
is the Supreme Court right in recognizing that protection for for-profit
entities, or is the European Court of Human Rights correct in denying
it?  We demonstrate that the Supreme Court sidesteps a rich body of
US case law on corporate form that recognizes the separation of the
corporate entity from its officers.  Instead, the Supreme Court confers
the owner’s beliefs onto the corporation itself, a tactic that would be
useful under the associational standing doctrine but that should still
not apply to Hobby Lobby.  Both US law and European mechanisms’
jurisprudence could have provided valuable insights for alternative
models; foremost, the distinction between non-profit and for-profit
enterprises and the recognition that only corporations whose member-
ship came together for the purpose of exercising religion — in other
words non-profit religious associations — should be able to assert
religious beliefs on behalf of their membership.  We argue that the
Supreme Court’s recognition of a corporation’s ability to exercise
religion in Hobby Lobby will have negative legal consequences.  We
explore the decision’s potential to diminish the reproductive and
healthcare rights of women and employees, legitimize discriminatory
conduct by corporations towards LGBTQ individuals, and deepen
ideological sorting and polarization in society.
INTRODUCTION
Hobby Lobby, a company that should only be an arts-and-crafter’s
dream, has become a lawyer’s conundrum.  To be precise, this puzzle
emerges from the United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) hold-
ing in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores1 (“Hobby Lobby”) that the contra-
ceptive mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(“RFRA”) because the mandate substantially burdened the religious
beliefs of the three closely-held corporations (“CHCs”) in the case.2
The Court placed Hobby Lobby Stores (“Hobby Lobby”), Mardel, and
Conestoga Wood Specialty Corporation (“Conestoga”) at the intersec-
tion of two of the most thrilling social and legal debates of our times.
Upon reading the Court’s decision, the lawyer — as well as the sensible
1 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2 Id. at 2759.
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hobby bricoleur — would wonder how far corporate “human” rights can
and should go and whether such rights can and should be correlated to
responsibilities.  They would also consider a variant of the separation of
church and state question and inquire into the extent to which the state
should protect human rights from religious interference.
The decision has important implications for human rights; in particular,
it weakens the protection of reproductive and healthcare rights and poses
possible threats to freedom from discrimination based on gender and sex-
ual orientation.  While this article discusses some of these consequences,
its primary aim is to explore a more basic aspect: which type of entity can
hold and exercise religious views.  It is this aspect that we identify as the
source of potential socio-legal conflict in the United States.  The analysis
compares the Supreme Court’s reasoning on corporate form, profit-mak-
ing objective, and limitations to religious exercise in Hobby Lobby3 to
relevant jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights
(“ECHR” or “Convention”) mechanisms — namely, the European Court
of Human Rights (“European Court”) and the now-defunct European
Commission on Human Rights (“Commission”).4  The comparative study
allows us to answer the core questions: Whose right and who’s right?
That is, does a corporate right to exercise religion exist?  And is the
Supreme Court right in granting such protection to for-profit entities, or
is the European Court correct in denying it?
Looking for inspiration outside the realm of US case law, to Europe,
proves an intricate endeavor, given the different structure of the Euro-
pean Court (as a supra-national court overseeing forty-seven sovereign
states) and the reticence of many in the US to recognize any value gained
from comparing foreign judgments.  Despite these caveats, the parallel
between the two jurisdictions provides a full account of how the interpre-
tations on corporate religious freedom differ and offers avenues for alter-
native interpretation.
The first part of the article summarizes the Supreme Court’s treatment
in Hobby Lobby of for-profit corporations as “persons” that can exercise
freedom of religion under the RFRA, and also identifies non-profit orga-
nizations with religious or philosophical objects as exclusive corporate
right-holders in the jurisprudence of the European Court and Commis-
sion.  We proceed to discuss the Supreme Court’s (mis)interpretation and
neglect of the legal separation between shareholders and company and
the standing requirement in US law.  We draw on the insights gained
3 Id. at 2751.
4 The European Commission on Human Rights operated until 1998, when it was
abolished by Protocol No. 11.  Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery
Established Thereby, entered into force Nov. 1, 1998, E.T.S. No. 155 (amending the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms)
[hereinafter Protocol 11] (restructuring the control machinery thereby established).
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from European practice to delineate alternative approaches.  The second
part of the article focuses on the Supreme Court’s treatment of state limi-
tations to corporate religious freedom in Hobby Lobby and also looks to
the ECHR mechanisms’ practice of restricting manifestations of religion
under the ECHR.  The aim here is to explore whether cross-fertilization
presents a potential platform to mitigate the shortcomings of the two
jurisdictions in casu.  In the third part, the article unearths some of the
socio-legal consequences brought about by the findings in Hobby Lobby.
In general, we argue that the exercise of religious freedom by for-profit
corporations leads to social polarization.  In relation to the contraceptive
mandate in the ACA, in particular, we identify a number of societal
groups that will disproportionally suffer from the judgment’s nocuous
effects.
I. WHOSE RIGHT IS THE EXERCISE OF RELIGION?
A. In the USA: Hobby Lobby Decides
In 2014, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby.5  The Supreme Court held that the contraceptive mandate
in the ACA violated the RFRA because it substantially burdened the
religious beliefs of the three CHCs in the suit, Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and
Conestoga, and in doing so, the legislation had not used the least restric-
tive means.6
The RFRA provides that the “government shall not substantially bur-
den a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability” unless it is “in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest,” and it is “the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.”7 Hobby Lobby raises a two-part
question: whether corporations are “persons” under the RFRA, and
whether they can exercise freedom of religion.8  The answer to this ques-
tion turns on the interpretation of three elements under the RFRA: (a)
corporate form, (b) profit-making objective, and (c) manifestations of
religion.9
For the purposes of the comparison with the European human rights
system, this two-part question is most salient since the ECHR mecha-
nisms have established strict parameters for what types of organizations
can exercise religion.10  As such, the type of organization bringing a claim
is dispositive for religious exercise claims in the European Court’s prac-
5 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
6 Id. at 2759.
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
8 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767-68.
9 See discussions infra Section I(A)(1)-(3).
10 See discussion infra Section I(B).
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tice, and we will argue here that it should have been a crucial element in
the Supreme Court’s analysis as well.11
As to the issue of personhood, the Supreme Court held that “person”
under the RFRA “include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals”
as defined in the Dictionary Act,12 which instructs courts on rules of
interpretation and grammatical construction as applied to federal statutes
definitions.13  According to the majority, there was no evidence that Con-
gress intended the RFRA to deviate from the Dictionary Act definition
of “person”;14 the majority found it inconceivable that non-profit corpo-
rations could be “persons” and benefit from RFRA protections while for-
profit corporations be excluded.15  The majority relied on three previous
cases16 to reach this conclusion: Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. E.E.O.C.,17 Gonzales v. O Centro Espı´rita
Beneficente Unia˜o do Vegetal,18 and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah.19
In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg pointed to a key distinction between
the non-profit and religious nature of the entities in the cases the majority
referenced, and the for-profit corporations at issue in Hobby Lobby.20
Ginsburg noted that religious organizations “exist to foster the interests
of persons subscribing to the same religious faith.”21  For-profit corpora-
tions, on the other hand, have a diverse constitution of employees and
officers.22  Although corporations may serve certain ancillary charitable
objectives, they do not “serve a community of believers,” and the law has
long treated them distinctively from religious organizations.23  This dis-
11 See id.
12 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
13 See generally 1 U.S.C. § 1.  Congress updated the Dictionary Act most recently
in 2002.
14 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.  On the contrary, the dissent noted that the
Dictionary Act only applies when the context does not indicate something else.  Here,
Justice Ginsburg argued, RFRA’s reference to a “person’s exercise of religion”
provides such context in conjunction with her interpretation of case law that for-profit
corporations cannot exercise religion. Id. at 2793-94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
15 Id. at 2769 (majority opinion).
16 Id. at 2768-69.
17 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (lawsuit brought against church which invoked Free
Exercise clause as a bar).
18 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA claim brought by church organized as non-profit in
New Mexico).
19 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Free Exercise claim brought by church organized as non-
profit in Florida).
20 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 2795.
22 Id. at 2797.
23 Id. at 2796-97.
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tinction in Ginsburg’s dissent,24 is key in the jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court and Commission, as we will argue below.
The majority further held in Hobby Lobby that the three CHCs at
issue could exercise religion for the purposes of the RFRA.25  It noted
that neither the corporate form nor the profit making objective precluded
the corporations at issue from exercising religion and that “exercise of
religion” is construed broadly to encompass the actions of Hobby Lobby,
Mardel, and Conestoga.26  The inclusion of corporations as “persons”
under the RFRA is fundamentally tied to the question of whether corpo-
rations can exercise religion under the RFRA.27  According to the major-
ity, such inclusion is meant to protect the rights of the individuals —
shareholders, officers, and employees — who comprise the corporation.28
Although the Third Circuit held that corporations cannot exercise relig-
ion because they cannot act separate and apart from their owners and
employees, the Supreme Court dispatched that argument.29  Just as cor-
porations are “persons” in order to protect the rights and obligations of
the individuals who comprise it, according to the majority, RFRA protec-
tion extends to the corporation’s beliefs in order to protect the beliefs of
the individuals who comprise it.30
1. Corporate Form
With little explanation, the Supreme Court held that corporate form
itself was not a bar to exercising religion because non-profit corporations
— still using a corporate form — can exercise religion.31  The dissent
shed marginally more light on the relationship between the corporate
form and the corporations’ ability to exercise religion: “By incorporating
a business, however, an individual separates herself from the entity and
escapes personal responsibility for the entity’s obligations.  One might
ask why the separation should hold only when it serves the interest of
those who control the corporation.”32
24 See id.
25 Id. at 2769-70 (majority opinion).
26 Id.
27 See id.
28 Id. at 2768 (“A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human
beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights and
obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are
associated with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the
rights of these people.”).
29 Id.
30 See id.
31 Id. at 2769.
32 Id. at 2797.
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2. Profit-Making Objective
The majority found that a profit-making purpose did not preclude such
for-profit corporations from exercising religion under the RFRA.33  It
noted that corporations can have purposes in addition to making a
profit.34  The majority referenced two prior free exercise cases involving
for-profit companies and stated that it would be inconsistent for the
Supreme Court to recognize those companies’ ability to exercise religion
but not Hobby Lobby’s, Mardel’s, or Conestoga’s.35  However, neither of
these cases addressed the latter issue of whether businesses could exer-
cise religion.  In Braunfeld v. Brown,36 the Supreme Court dismissed a
free exercise claim brought by a for-profit sole proprietorship on the mer-
its rather than for lack of standing.37  In Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market, Inc.,38 a plurality dismissed the free exercise claim brought by
four natural persons and a for-profit corporation on the merits without
deciding the issue of standing.39
3. Manifestations of Religion
Finally, the Supreme Court adopted an expansive definition of relig-
ious exercise.  In particular, it relied on the Religious Land Use and Insti-
tutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), which amended the
RFRA to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by,
or central to, a system of religious belief.”40  The Court emphasized the
RLUIPA’s explicit mandate to construe its language “in favor of a broad
protection of religious exercise,”41 and held that the “‘exercise of relig-
ion’ involves ‘not only belief and profession but the performance of (or
abstention from) physical acts’ that are ‘engaged in for religious rea-
sons.’”42  Precedent supports that expansive definition.  In Wisconsin v.
Yoder,43 the Supreme Court held that religious exercise extended beyond
worship and belief and encompassed the parties’ exercise of religious
belief even when it affected a third party.44  Religious exercise is not all-
encompassing, however.  The Supreme Court also found that a way of life
33 Id. at 2770-71 (majority opinion).
34 Id.
35 See id. at 2769 n.21, 2770.
36 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
37 Id. at 601.
38 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
39 See id. at 618, 631.
40 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 2770.  At the same time, the dissent noted that RFRA incorporated
RLUIPA’s amended definition of religious exercise, but it did not include the same
construction mandate. Id. at 2792 n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
43 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
44 Id. at 219-20.
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or philosophy did not warrant protection under the Free Exercise or
Establishment Clauses unless “rooted in religious belief.”45  With regard
to the law’s burden on religion, the majority in Hobby Lobby stated that
even a law that makes it more expensive to practice religious beliefs
imposes a burden on religious exercise, when applied in the context of a
business46 — an issue to be explored in the second part of the article.
B. “European” Freedom of Religion
Over time, freedom of religion claims brought before the European
Court of Human Rights have raised some of the most sensitive interpre-
tative issues, a feature the European system appears to share with the
Supreme Court case law.  In their jurisprudence, the ECHR mechanisms
have carved out, gradually and by no means in a linear fashion, answers
to a set of questions similar to those that preoccupied the Supreme Court
justices in Hobby Lobby: who holds the right to religious freedom, what
are manifestations of religion, and what sort of limitations can be
imposed on such religious exercise.47  Insights into these findings will aid
in our de-construction of the Hobby Lobby judgment and the examina-
tion of some of its implications.
During the early days of the European human rights project, it was not
readily apparent which entities could hold, exercise, and claim freedom of
religion.  Article 9(1) of the ECHR stipulates that “[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” including “freedom
to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in commu-
nity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”48  Article 34 of Protocol
11, which superseded Article 25 of the ECHR, clarifies the standing
requirement:
The Court may receive applications from any person, non-govern-
mental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim
of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set
forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.49
In determining the list of qualifying entities, the Commission and the
European Court decided to expressly exclude governmental organiza-
tions, stating that those entities that “exercise governmental powers” can-
45 Id. at 215.
46 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605
(1961)).
47 For the issue of limitations see discussion infra Section II.  The analysis in this
part and infra p. 30 draws on case law discussed at length in IOANA CISMAS,
RELIGIOUS ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 85-93, 99-106, 119-50 (2014).
48 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 9(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
49 Protocol 11, supra note 4, art. 34. R
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not hold and invoke rights under the Convention.50  The obvious right-
holders of religious freedom, which meet the provisions of the above-
cited Article 9 of the ECHR and Article 34 of Protocol 11, are individuals
and groups of individuals — the latter may denote unincorporated
entities.
But beyond these two cases, can a church that is an incorporated non-
profit entity, a profit-making corporation with some religious or philo-
sophical aims, a for-profit company, and a secular non-profit organization
invoke the protection afforded by Article 9 under the ECHR?  As we can
see, the possibilities for right-holders of religious freedom are numerous,
yet the recognized right-holders remain few in the authoritative view of
the European mechanisms.
1. Corporate Form
In 1968, the very first case in which the Church of Scientology in the
United Kingdom, a corporate entity, claimed the right to religious free-
dom under the ECHR, was swiftly dismissed.51 The Commission held that
as “a legal and not a natural person,” the corporation was “incapable of
having or exercising the rights mentioned in Article 9, paragraph 1 of the
Convention.”52  In their dismissal, the commissioners considered whether
a legal entity or corporation could have or manifest religion.53  In X and
Church of Scientology v. Sweden, the Commission reversed its denial of
religious freedom rights for churches on the following grounds:
When a church body lodges an application under the Convention, it
does so in reality, on behalf of its members.  It should therefore be
accepted that a church body is capable of possessing and exercising
the rights contained in Article 9 (1) in its own capacity as a represen-
tative of its members . . . .  Accordingly, the Church of Scientology,
as a non-governmental organisation, can properly be considered to
be an applicant within the meaning of Article 25 (1) of the
Convention.54
50 See Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Finska
Fo¨rsamlingen i Stockholm & Hautaniemi v. Sweden, App. No. 24019/94, 1996 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 94.  A discussion related to established churches which
arguably would have state involvement, which may or may not amount to
governmental powers can be found in CISMAS, supra note 47, at 88-93.
51 Church of X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3798/68, 1969 Eur. Comm’n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 70, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-3072.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 X & Church of Scientology v. Sweden, App. No. 7805/11, 1979 Eur. Comm’n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 68, 70, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70084.
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The “aggregating of the rights”55 of individuals lies at the origin of the
right of a church to manifest religion.  Under this derivative framework,
individuals, who are undeniable holders of the right to freedom of relig-
ion, set up the church for the principal purpose of collectively manifesting
their religion.  Therefore, the right of a church to manifest religion stems
from the individuals’ right to collectively exercise religion.  Without
acknowledging first, the derivative aspect, and second, the fundamentally
religious objective, for which the church was established, “the non-human
nature of a legal entity that prevents it from exercising the right to life,
for example, would similarly prevent a church from manifesting religion
or a humanist organization from exercising beliefs.”56
2. (Non) Profit-making and Religious or Philosophical Objects
European jurisprudence has consistently illustrated that the religious
or philosophical objects derived from the individuals’ right to freedom of
religion is paramount for the European mechanisms to recognize corpo-
rate persons as right-holders of Article 9.  For instance, in Company X v.
Switzerland57 — where a limited liability company that ran a printing
office in the canton of Zurich complained that the church taxes levied by
cantonal authorities represented an infringement of its religious freedom
— the Commission dismissed the claim, explaining that:
Even supposing that the applicant’s claim may fall within the ambit
of Article 9 of the Convention, the Commission is nevertheless of the
opinion that a limited liability company given the fact that it con-
cerns a profit-making corporate body, can neither enjoy nor rely on
the rights referred to in Article 9, paragraphe 1 [sic], of the
Convention.58
While the Commission had surely not intended to suggest that there is
an epistemological incompatibility between profit and religion, its deci-
sion does suggest that in the case of a profit-making company the link to
the individuals’ right to collectively exercise religion is missing.  Likely,
the assumption was that an individual establishes a profit-making corpo-
ration for the purpose of making profit and not with the goal to further a
religious objective.
While such an assumption may be valid in the case of Company X,
there are two important test cases: the first situation concerns a profit-
55 CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (2001).
56 Recognizing that the collective right of individuals lies at the origin of the
church’s right to manifest religion does not of course mean that a perfect
representation of the church members’ interests must exist. See CISMAS, supra note
47, at 100-01.
57 Company X v. Switzerland, App. No. 7865/77, 1979 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 86, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-74195.
58 Id. at 87.
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making corporation that explicitly listed among its objectives certain
religious aims — as Hobby Lobby did59 — and the second concerns a
single shareholder and employee of a for-profit corporation that objected
to a church levy against the company.
The first case, Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB v. Finland, involved
another petition that challenged the levying of a church tax.60  In this
case, the first applicant was a Finnish publishing company owned by the
second applicant, the registered umbrella association of Finnish
freethinkers.61  The petition claimed that the corporation was established
with the purpose of publishing books that promoted the aims of the
freethinkers’ movement.62  It also clarified that, while it had “certain
modest economic activities [the company did] not aim at producing profit
but at having the Church separated from the State” — in other words, it
had some philosophical aims.63  While the Commission accepted that the
company might have pursued philosophical objects, it held:
For the purposes of domestic law this applicant was registered as a
corporate body with limited liability.  As such it is in principle
required by domestic law to pay tax as any other corporate body,
regardless of the underlying purpose of its activities on account of its
links with the applicant association and its branches and irrespective
of the final receiver of the tax revenues collected from it.64
The Commission refused to pierce the corporate veil due to the
Freethinkers Association’s failure to show that it had been prevented
from pursuing the company’s publishing activities “in its own name.”65  In
other words, the Association failed to demonstrate that the for-profit cor-
porate form was the only available form under Finnish law that allowed
the Freethinkers to pursue their philosophical aim.  It is important to note
that in Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court did not examine alternative
forms of organizations in which the owners of the three CHCs could have
pursued their religious aims.
The second illustrative case involves a single shareholder and employee
of a for-profit corporation.  The shareholder, an opponent of the church,
complained that having to personally pay the church tax levied against
her company amounted to an indignity and insult, and requested, given
the particular form of her company, that the court pierce the corporate
veil and recognize her religious freedom as a ground for church tax
59 See discussion infra at pp. 24-25.
60 Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB v. Finland, App. No. 20471/92, 1996 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 29, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-2816.




65 Id. at 43.
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exemption.66  This case was decided by Swiss courts; yet in reaffirming its
earlier jurisprudence, the Swiss Federal Tribunal relied on the finding of
the European Commission on Human Rights in Company X v.
Switzerland.67
The Tribunal chiefly pointed to the financial benefits brought about by
the establishment of a corporation, which separates the individual’s assets
from those of the corporation.68  Consequently, it emphasized that the
payment of taxes are among the obligations ensuing from such separation
between the corporation and the individual.69  The Tribunal explained
that for the purposes of taxation, corporations and other legal persons
have separate burdens from those of the individuals, that is natural per-
sons or shareholders, who comprise them.70  As a result of that separate
treatment, “the religious freedom of the natural persons behind the activ-
ity of a legal person is therefore not relevant in taxation cases” — not
even when the natural person is so close, literally speaking, to the legal
person.71  Interestingly, the Supreme Court has long upheld taxation over
claims of religious-based exemptions72 because of the compelling govern-
ment interests taxes serve, but as demonstrated below in Section III, the
Court improperly distinguished Hobby Lobby from its precedent on
taxation.73
Having clarified that the for-profit character of a corporation excludes
it from enjoying religious freedom, a second question arises: would non-
profit organizations without religious or philosophical — for lack of a
better shorter word, secular — objects be able to hold and invoke Article
9 rights of the ECHR?  The Commission, in the case Verein ‘Kontakt-
Information-Therapie’ (KIT) and Siegfried Hagen v. Austria, answered
the question in the negative as such organizations would not manifest a
belief or religion; however, their expressions, thoughts and conscience
would be protected under Article 10 of the ECHR.74
66 Bundesgerichts [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 22, 2010, 2C.71/2010
(Switz.), http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr//bger/100922_2C_71-2010.html.
67 Id. ¶ 4.2. See discussion in CISMAS, supra note 47, at 102-04.
68 CISMAS, supra note 47, at 102-04. R
69 See id.
70 Id.
71 See id. at 103 n.100.
72 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (“Congress drew a line in
§ 1402(g), exempting the self-employed Amish but not all persons working for an
Amish employer.  The tax imposed on employers to support the social security system
must be uniformly applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly
otherwise.”).
73 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2803-04.
74 Verein ‘Kontakt-Information-Therapie’ (KIT) & Siegfried Hagen v. Austria,
App. No. 11921/86, 1988 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 81.  For the distinction
drawn, for purposes of Article 9 application, between “thought and conscience” and
“religion and belief,” see EVANS, supra note 55, at 293. R
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In conclusion, the European Court and Commission have recognized
two undisputable holders of the right to freedom of religion under Article
9 of the ECHR: individuals and groups of individuals.  The third right-
holder is a corporation of a very specific kind: one that has objectives that
are religious or philosophical and not-for-profit.  The specific attributes of
this corporation reflect that the recognition of this entity as a right-holder
depends on the derivation of its right from the rights of individuals to
come together and collectively manifest their religion by setting up relig-
ious entities.  This is the starkest point of contrast between European case
law and the finding in Hobby Lobby, through which the Supreme Court
has greatly expanded the right-holders of religious freedom in the United
States — exactly how much remains to be seen.
3. Manifestations of Religion
The ECHR does not define “religion,” hence the query is: what are the
manifestations of religion?  Beyond the ECHR, the absence of a defini-
tion of religion is notorious in international law.  Natan Lerner observed
that “religion, in general, has been too hard to define,” which has led
drafters of international instruments to opt for “a catalog of rights in the
sphere of religion under the heading freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion.”75  Freedom of belief and philosophical convictions are the other
concepts that form part of the “conflation of terms” in the sphere of relig-
ion.76  As such, international adjudicative mechanisms, including the
European Court, are guided in their interpretation of religious exercise
by some central principles and the rights listed in their respective
instruments.77
There is agreement in doctrine and practice on some central principles:
namely, what a definition of religion should not exclude and conversely,
what it should exclude.  General Comment 22 of the Human Rights Com-
mittee (“Comment”) illustrates these principles.78  The Comment holds
that “religion” and “belief” should be understood broadly and are not
limited to “traditional religions or religions and beliefs with institutional
characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions.”79
75 NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, BELIEFS, AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 3
(Religion and Human Rights Series, 2000).
76 Id.
77 John Witte Jr. illustrates the variety of methods which courts embrace to assess
what religion is and what it is not. See John Witte Jr., Introduction to  HUMAN RIGHTS
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES xxiv (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D.
van der Vyver eds., 1996); see also ECHR, supra note 48. R
78 See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 22, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Sept. 27, 1993) [hereinafter General Comment No. 22] (“Article 18
protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess
any religion or belief.”).
79 Id.
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States and doctrine generally accept that theistic, non-theistic, and
atheistic beliefs are included within a definition of religion or belief.80
Faced with defining the term “philosophical convictions,” the European
Court provided some guidelines: these convictions should “attain a cer-
tain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance,” be worthy
of respect in a democratic society, and should not be incompatible with
human dignity.81  States generally understand that racism, apartheid, and
Nazism should not fall within the definition of religion, belief, or philo-
sophical convictions protected by international law.82
The catalogue of rights entailed in the ECHR provides in Article 9 for
the right to “manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice,
and observance.”83  The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief provides a
detailed and non-exhaustive list as to what individual and collective relig-
ious manifestations may include.84
Similar to the Supreme Court, the European mechanisms have adopted
an expansive view on religious exercise and are generally reluctant to
assess whether religious beliefs are legitimate or reasonable.  The Euro-
80 See Elizabeth Odio Benito (Special Rapporteur), Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief: Study of the Current
Dimensions of the Problems of Intolerance and of Discrimination on Grounds of
Religion or Belief, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26 (1986), http://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G86/119/39/pdf/G8611939.pdf?OpenElement;
Natan Lerner, Religious Human Rights under the United Nations, in 2 RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 79, 131 (Johan D.
van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996). See also General Comment No. 22, supra
note 78, ¶ 2.
81 Campbell & Cosans v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 7511/76 & 7743/76, 48 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 36-37 (ser. A) (1982), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57455.
82 See Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the
UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82
AM. J. INT’L L. 487, 491 & n.17 (1988).
83 ECHR, supra note 48, art. 9(2).
84 These include: worshipping and assembling in connection with a religion or
belief, establishing and maintaining places of worship, appropriate charitable or
humanitarian institutions; making, acquiring and using necessary articles and
materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief; writing, issuing and
disseminating relevant publications; teaching a religion or belief in places suitable for
these purposes; soliciting and receiving voluntary financial and other contributions
from individuals and institutions; training, appointing, electing or designating by
succession appropriate leaders; observing days of rest and celebrating holidays and
ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one’s religion or belief; establishing
and maintaining communications with individuals and communities in matters of
religion and belief at the national and international levels.  Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at art. 6 a-i.I, U.N. Doc. A/36/
51 (1981), http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm.
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pean Court often states that “but for very exceptional cases, . . . [the]
right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes
any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious
beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate.”85  This
statement means that often the European Court itself refuses to pin down
whether a manifestation claimed as religious or philosophical fulfills such
criteria; instead, the Court seeks to analyze whether the state interference
pursued a legitimate aim and was proportional without deciding in the
first place whether a breach of the right to manifest religious freedom
occurred.86  We shall return to this point when we examine permissible
limitations on the freedom of religion.
C. Alternative Paths of Interpretation
The comparative overview of Hobby Lobby and European case law
shows that there is agreement on both sides of the Atlantic for a generous
interpretation of religious exercise.  Beyond this consensus, the Supreme
Court and the European mechanisms diverge on the issue of the right-
holder.  After Hobby Lobby, US law holds that for-profit CHCs are “per-
sons” that can exercise religious freedom under the RFRA.87  On the
other hand, the European Court recognizes that only non-profit organiza-
tions with religious or philosophical objects (chiefly churches and other
religious and freethinker-type organizations) can assert their rights to
religious freedom within the meaning of Article 9 of the ECHR.88
We posit here that the application of the right to religious freedom to
for-profit corporations ignores fundamental aspects of the corporate form
as well as organizational privileges and individual protections that ema-
nate from the corporate form as enshrined in US law.  Additionally, the
Supreme Court’s inability to distinguish between non-profit and for-
profit organizations ignores US case law and theory that would otherwise
enable a more rational, if not perfect, policy on religious freedom.  In
contrast, the European Court’s jurisprudence rightly recognizes corpo-
rate particularities and the implications of a for-profit objective.
Although the Supreme Court formally recognized the right to exercise
religion only for the CHCs in Hobby Lobby, its rationale has no foresee-
able limits, thereby extending such rights to a broader range of corpora-
tions.89  However, the concept of associational standing, already accepted
85 Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1339, ¶ 78
(2000).
86 See, e.g., Chappell v. United Kingdom, 152-A 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989); see
also EVANS, supra note 55, at 283-84.
87 See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
88 See supra Section I(B).
89 The Court claims that it did not create an open door for all corporations to
exercise religion, but it provides no rationale for limiting its application in future
cases.  As Justice Ginsburg noted in the dissent, the Court’s “logic extends to
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in US law, could logically limit the recognition of the right to religious
freedom to religious non-profit organizations.  A similar analysis of col-
lective rights exists in the European Court’s acknowledgment of religious
rights solely for organizations with religious and philosophical objects.
1. Legal Separation Between Shareholders and Company in US
Law
Hobby Lobby appears to ignore fundamental aspects of corporate
form and its associated privileges.  The very purpose of incorporating in
the US is to create a separate entity that is distinct from the individuals
who comprise the corporation.90  The corporation thereby gains special
privileges such as legal agency, continuity, and investment incentives
through limited liability.91  This separation is sacrosanct, and courts only
invalidate the separation when the individuals are using corporate form
fraudulently or unfairly.92  Thus, it is antithetical to corporate form to
break the separation between the corporation and its owners, imputing
the owners’ beliefs to the corporate entity, while still upholding the sepa-
ration for other formal purposes.93
As any first year law student knows, corporate organization in the US
necessarily includes a separation between shareholders, directors or
officers, and the corporate entity.94  The separation between the corpo-
rate entity and the natural persons who comprise it — the corporate veil
— carries special privileges that enable corporations to profit.95  Most
fundamentally, the separate corporate entity enables the corporation to
corporations of any size, public or private.” Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
90 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 315 (2010); see also David Millon,
Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 215-16 (describing changes in the
theories of incorporation over the 20th century and the rejection of attempts to
conceptualize corporations as aggregates of their members). Amici Curiae Corporate
and Criminal Law Professors, noted that similar distinctions between corporate
entities and the natural persons who comprise the corporation exist in criminal and
agency law.  Brief for Corporate and Criminal Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 13-16, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores,  Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678
(2013) (Nos. 13-354 & 13-356), 2014 WL 333889 at *10 [hereinafter Law Professors’
Amicus Brief].
91 WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 83, 85 (3d ed. 2009).  This is the dominant theory of
incorporation.  For a brief overview of this and other theories of incorporation, see
STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:2 (14th ed. 2014).
92 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 91, at 85-86.
93 See, e.g., Diamond Chem. Co. v. Atofina Chem, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7
(D.D.C. 2003).
94 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 91, at 85.
95 Id. at 83; see also Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Mich. 1995)
(“[T]his presumption [is] often referred to as the corporate veil.”).
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act in a legal capacity, for example, by entering into binding agree-
ments.96  In addition, the separate entity enables the corporation to con-
tinue indefinitely and without depending on the natural lives of its
officers.97  Perhaps the most cited privilege of the corporate veil is that it
shields the natural persons from liability for actions of the corporation’s
management and shields individual assets from creditors.98  Under nor-
mal circumstances, creditors can only recover from the corporation itself,
not from its shareholders or management — a privilege which benefits
corporations in many respects.99
Despite the quintessence of the corporate veil for the corporation,
under rare circumstances, courts may pierce the veil, reaching the assets
of the natural persons or attributing the actions of the corporate entity to
the natural persons.100  Across US state jurisdictions, courts generally
examine whether a unity of interest and ownership negates the purported
separate personalities of the individual and the corporate entity, in addi-
tion (depending on the jurisdiction) to whether there is fraud or
unfairness.101
For example, the Van Dorn Test, a common test for piercing the corpo-
rate veil, requires, first, “such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer
exist; and second, circumstances must be such that adherence to the fic-
tion of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud or promote
injustice.”102  Similarly, the Laya Test requires, first, unity of interest and
ownership that negates the separate personalities of the corporation and
individual, and second, that inequality or unfairness would exist if the veil
were not pierced.103
Both tests examine various factors to determine the absence of actual
separation between the individuals and the corporate entity.  These fac-
tors include: noncompliance with corporate formalities (e.g. holding regu-
lar meetings, keeping records, maintaining financial records, etc.),
96 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 91, at 85.
97 Id. at 86.
98 Law Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 90, at 6.
99 To name just a few benefits, limited liability functionally facilitates investment in
corporations, enables stockholders to transfer shares more freely, and allows for a
dual system of remote ownership and centralized management. ALLEN ET AL., supra
note 91, at 83-84.
100 See, e.g., Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under
Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854 (1982).
101 Id.
102 Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569-70 (7th Cir.
1985).
103 Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 99 (W. Va. 1986).  The Laya test also
includes an optional third prong that examines how much diligence the other entities
made in transacting with the corporation, for example, whether the other entities
overlooked the flaws in corporate form. Id. at 100.
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comingling of funds or business assets, undercapitalization, and disre-
garding boundaries between companies.104  In practice, courts look at all
of the above factors, but the corporation’s (non)adherence to corporate
forms greatly affects a court’s decision whether to pierce the corporate
veil.105
The majority in Hobby Lobby essentially pierced the corporate veil for
the select purpose of attributing the religious beliefs of the corporations’
owners to the corporate entities.106  Meanwhile, Hobby Lobby, Mardel,
and Conestoga still enjoy the privileges of incorporation and would not
meet the standards for piercing the veil with respect to their corporate
activities.107  The corporations would not meet the second prong of either
the Van Dorn or Laya tests, requiring fraud or unfairness, respectively.108
Most importantly, the three corporations do not exhibit such “unity of
interest and ownership” to negate the separation between the corpora-
tions and the owners.109  In fact, none of the parties in Hobby Lobby so
much as alleged that the corporations did not follow corporate formali-
ties, or any of the other factors that demonstrate unity of interest and
ownership.110
Admittedly, the classification of Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga
as CHCs is not entirely irrelevant.  Courts rarely pierce the veils of pub-
licly traded corporations — those that sell their stock to the general pub-
lic — because such corporations are more likely to follow corporate
formalities;111 but they do so more frequently in the case of CHCs.112
The explanation is that CHCs may have fewer shareholders,113 who may
have dual roles as corporate officers and investors,114 and, as a result,
may follow fewer corporate formalities.115  The more a CHC (or any cor-
poration) diverges from corporate formalities the more likely it is that a
104 Van Dorn, 753 F.2d at 570; Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 99.
105 See supra note 104.
106 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
107 Id.
108 Van Dorn, 753 F.2d at 570; Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 99.
109 Law Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 90, at 13-15, 17.
110 See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
111 Nicholas B. Allen, Note, Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil: A
Straightforward Path to Justice, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1147, 1151, n. 29 (2011).
112 HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS:
LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:18 (Rev. 3d ed. 2015) (“[T]he reality of piercing litigation is
that this issue is limited to close corporations.”). See generally Robert B. Thompson,
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036 (1991).
113 As noted in Ginsburg’s dissent, though CHCs are commonly conceived as
smaller companies, even very large corporations, such as Hobby Lobby, can be closely
held. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797, n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
114 ALLEN ET AL., supra note 91, at 84.
115 See, e.g., Thomas M. Madden, Identity Confusion and the Close Corporation:
Do Corporate Formalities Matter?, 54 R.I. B.J. 5 (2005).
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court will pierce the corporate veil and hold individual shareholders
responsible for the actions initially attributed to the corporate entity.116
The corporate form, therefore, is essential to the corporations’ protec-
tions and privileges.  It is rather curious that the Supreme Court did not
discuss in Hobby Lobby whether the three corporations adhered to the
corporate form, only that they were, in fact, CHCs.117  Yet, their particu-
lar classification as CHCs alone should not have led to the piercing of
their corporate veil.
Another type of for-profit business, the sole proprietorship, is com-
prised of one person and is not incorporated; as a result, the business is
indistinguishable from the owner.118  Consequently, it does not need to
follow any organizational formalities and does not receive the benefits
associated with those formalities such as legal agency (except that which
the owner can exercise), continuity, and limited liability.119  The Supreme
Court could have faced the question of whether a sole proprietorship
could exercise religion under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment in Braunfeld v. Brown.120  However, the Court did not
address that question; instead, without distinguishing between the busi-
nesses in question and their owners, it dismissed the case on the merits.121
The Court held that the Sunday-closing law in question was constitu-
tional (this was not an RFRA claim) because it was a general law,
advancing a secular state purpose, with only an indirect effect on religion,
and there were no less burdensome means to pursue its goal.122  As we
have argued previously, the majority’s reliance on this case in Hobby
Lobby was far-fetched.  Ironically, the effect of Hobby Lobby on whether
a sole proprietorship can exercise religion is more direct: given the
Court’s ruling that a CHC can exercise religion, it is likely that the sole
proprietorship could as well.  Therefore, the circle of corporate holders of
religious freedom is further expanding.
116 See, e.g., Trustees of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Pension, Health Benefit & Educ.
Funds v. Lutyk, 332 F.3d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding district court’s veil
piercing, where there existed a “dearth” of corporate formalities, among other
factors); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers v.
Aguirre, 410 F.3d 297, 303 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding district court decision not to
pierce the veil where the corporation followed formalities); Judson Atkinson Candies,
Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 379 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding
district court decision not to pierce the veil where the only disregard of corporate
formalities was failure to file tax returns for certain years).
117 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
118 1 LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: LAW, PRACTICE, & FORMS § 4:7 (2014).
119 Id.
120 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961).
121 Id. at 607.
122 Id.
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Separately, an entity known as the “corporation sole” is the incorpora-
tion of the leader or officer of an organization.123  Though uncommon
today, the corporation sole requires explanation here because it is often
associated with religious organizations.  This corporate form, created
especially for religious entities to enjoy corporate privileges, maintains a
strict separation between the individual, his religion, and the corporate
business.124  Under English common law, corporations sole were created
for religious organizations to hold property and pass it on when new indi-
viduals succeeded ecclesiastical positions — in other words, they were
given the privilege of continuity just like modern corporations.125
Under current US law, some states provide for corporations sole by
statute, often explicitly for religious organizations.126  They allow, for
example, for a newly appointed archbishop of a church to succeed an old
one, whereby the corporation sole’s assets will continue to be its prop-
erty.127  Meanwhile the old archbishop (or his heirs) will not have any
rights to that property.  Because the corporation sole is a separate entity
from the individual officer, the corporation receives the benefits associ-
ated with incorporation — most notably here, the indefinite life of the
corporation, but also limited liability and accountability for corporate
actions.128  On the other hand, corporations sole do not follow most cor-
porate formalities.129  Though an anomaly in current law, the corporation
sole demonstrates the importance of the separate corporate entity: even a
religious figure, incorporated in order to reap the benefits of continuity
and legal agency, is examined separately in her business practices from
her religious denominational duties and her individual religious beliefs.
The Supreme Court’s imputation of the corporate owners’ personal
beliefs to the corporations in Hobby Lobby ignores the separate corpo-
rate entities in a way that parallels — but inverts — the piercing of the
corporate veil.  The Court stated that “protecting the free-exercise rights
of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the
123 Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995
BYU L. REV. 439, 454 (1995).
124 See, e.g., Wood v. Benedictine Soc’y of Ala., 530 So.2d 801, 805 (Ala. 1988)
(refusing to hold a corporation sole — in this case a bishop’s incorporation — liable
for actions committed by a priest, whose relationship with the bishop was religious,
and therefore the priest did not have a business relationship with the corporation
sole); Stevens v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 49 Cal.App.3d 877, 123 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1975) (holding a corporation sole — also a bishop’s incorporation — liable
for actions committed by a priest who was acting in the scope of business).
125 Gerstenblith, supra note 123, at 455-56.
126 Id. at 456-58.
127 Id. at 459-60.
128 James B. O’Hara, The Modern Corporation Sole, 93 DICK. L. REV. 23, 26
(1988).
129 1 WILLIAM W. BASSETT ET AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW
§ 3:52 (2013).
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religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.”130
Although it is true that the corporate entity is a legal fiction, ignoring that
separation disregards the form that the owners of Hobby Lobby, Mardel,
and Conestoga affirmatively chose for their companies, a form which
comes with numerous privileges, including profit-making.131 Amici curiae
Corporate and Criminal Law Professors described the major inconsis-
tency with the corporations’ approach succinctly: “Hobby Lobby[,] [Mar-
del,] and Conestoga want to argue, in effect, that the corporate veil is
only a one-way street: its shareholders can get protection from tort or
contract liability by standing behind the veil, but the corporation can ask
a court to disregard the corporate veil on this occasion.”132  From a cor-
porate owner’s perspective, it is a rather ideal situation; yet even from
such perspective, it remains inconsistent with legal theory and previous
practice.
2. Standing
In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court stated that it could not find a
reason to prohibit a closely held corporation from exercising religion
under the RFRA when it had previously allowed non-profit corporations
to do so.133  The separation between the corporate entity and its mem-
bers, as explained above, nevertheless provides a strong reason to
exclude corporations.  Meanwhile, as we shall see in this section, the con-
cept of associational standing serves as an opportune exception for cer-
tain non-profit corporations — both allowing the Supreme Court to
follow its past precedent and creating a scheme that parallels the Euro-
pean treatment of religious rights for non-profit entities with religious
and philosophical objects.
A long-standing principle in US law generally prohibits a party from
bringing a claim on behalf of others.134  But this prohibited action is
exactly what the corporations in Hobby Lobby attempted since they are
distinct corporate entities, and as the Supreme Court recognized, they
assert the religious rights of the people who comprise the corporations.135
Federal law in the US restricts which entities or natural persons are able
to bring suit under the doctrine of standing and requires two components:
constitutional standing and prudential standing.136
130 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
131 See id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
132 Law Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 90, at 14.
133 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769.
134 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
135 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
136 Tacy F. Flint, A New Brand of Representational Standing, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
1037, 1037 (2003).
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Article III of the Constitution only gives courts the authority to hear
“cases or controversies,”137 which in turn requires that (1) the plaintiff
has suffered an “injury in fact,” (2) a causal connection exists between the
conduct at issue and the injury, and (3) a court’s decision can provide
redress for the injury.138  In addition, under the doctrine of prudential
standing, courts exercise restraint, declining to hear cases brought on
behalf of third parties, cases involving generalized grievances, and cases
that are not within the “zone of interests” that the statute was enacted to
protect.139
Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga each have distinct corporate
entities that could file lawsuits on behalf of their own corporate inter-
ests.140  In order to do so, the corporations would need to show that they
have organizational standing,141 that is, each of the three corporations
must show the three constitutional requirements for standing: injury in
fact, causation, and redressibility.142  Thus, the organization must demon-
strate that “the entity itself suffered a ‘concrete injury’ to its own inter-
ests, apart from any separately identified injury to third parties, such as
employees, officers, owners, or shareholders.”143  Further, the injury in
fact cannot be merely an “organizational interest” in the problem.144
Because mere interest in the contraception requirement is not enough for
organizational standing, the “corporations would have to show ‘injury’ to
their religious exercise”; however, they could not make this showing
“except by invoking the beliefs and rights of the separate owners of the
corporation.”145
In fact, the Supreme Court, in ruling for the corporations, did just that
— it invoked the rights of the natural persons comprising the corpora-
tions: “When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to
corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of people, including
shareholders, officers, and employees, who are associated with a corpora-
tion in one way or another.”146  Given that there are several narrow doc-
trinal exceptions to the bar on asserting the rights of others, including
associational standing and third party standing,147 we will show how
neither of these two exceptions would apply in Hobby Lobby.  We will
137 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
138 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
139 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
140 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
141 See id. at 2768 n.13.
142 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
143 Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 95, 139 (2014).
144 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-39 (1972).
145 Garrett, supra note 143, at 143.
146 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
147 See Garrett, supra note 143, at 102.
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also show how associational standing could be the key to distinguishing
between religious exercise claims of non-profit versus for-profit
corporations.
(i) Associational Standing
Under the associational standing exception, an organization may have
associational standing on behalf of its members if it shows that (1) at least
one member would have standing individually, (2) the interests the
organization seeks to protect in court are germane to the organization’s
purpose, and (3) neither the claim nor relief require the individual’s par-
ticipation in the lawsuit.148  While the Court in Hobby Lobby found no
rationale for distinguishing between non-profit and for-profit corpora-
tions’ exercise of religion under the RFRA, the associational standing
exception could and should have provided a conceptual framework for
distinguishing Hobby Lobby from prior cases that accepted that non-
profits could manifest religion.149
This exception recognizes the purpose of certain types of organizations
where common interests bring individual members together.150  In
allowing associations to bring claims, the Supreme Court explained that
the association is merely “the medium through which its individual mem-
bers seek to make more effective the expression of their own views.”151
Allowing the association, rather than the members individually, to sue
may further serve the members’ interests on a practical level because an
association may be in a better position to bring a suit.152
Associational standing is not unlike the European mechanisms’ prac-
tice, which recognizes that organizations with religious and philosophical
objects can invoke religious freedom under the ECHR.153  European
practice, we recall, considers that individuals can choose to express their
religious freedom collectively in an organized or associational form, and
as such, by extension, churches and other religious organizations acquire
the right to religious freedom and Article 9 standing before European
mechanisms.154
As a threshold matter, US jurisprudence allows only groups of people
who have come together with a common interest to assert associational
standing, but the courts apply fairly loose standards for what constitutes
148 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
149 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769; discussion on associational standing infra
this section.
150 Garrett, supra note 143, at 137.
151 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958).
152 See Garrett, supra note 143, at 138 (citing UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289
(1986)).
153 See discussion supra Section I(B)(2).
154 Id.
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an association.155  If an association is not a “traditional membership
organization,”156 it must serve a particular part of the community, the
individuals that make of the association must have the “indicia of mem-
bership,” and the organization’s “fortunes must be tied closely to those of
its constituency.”157  It would be a stretch to suggest that Hobby Lobby,
Mardel, and Conestoga Woods are membership associations for the pur-
poses of associational standing.  However, we now examine associational
standing tests in relation to Hobby Lobby to understand why standing is
not appropriate in this case, but may be for a religious organization.
If the corporations in Hobby Lobby were associations, it is likely that
they would have satisfied the first prong of associational standing,
because at least one member of each CHC would have standing individu-
ally.158  The Hahns, the family owners of Conestoga, are devout Men-
nonites who believe that life begins at conception, and oppose
contraception that could prevent pregnancy after the fertilization of the
egg.159  The Greens, the family owners of Hobby Lobby and Mardel, are
devout Christians who “believe that life begins at conception and that it
would violate their religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or
devices that operate after that point.”160
However, the corporate form of Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga
makes it so that they would have failed to satisfy the second prong of
associational standing — that their abilities to exercise their religious
beliefs are germane to the organizations’ purposes.161  The Supreme
Court did analyze the purposes of the corporations and found that the
references to their religious beliefs in their various organizational docu-
ments could indicate non-profit-making purposes.162  For example, Con-
estoga’s “Vision and Values Statement” notes that the company aims to
make a profit in a manner reflecting the owners’ “Christian heritage,”163
and its Board of Directors adopted a “Statement on the Sanctity of
Human Life” stating that “life begins at conception” and that it is a sin to
terminate life.164
Similarly, Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose commits the Board of
Directors to “Honoring the Lord in all we do by operating the company
in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.”165  The Greens, insofar
155 Garrett, supra note 143, at 138.
156 Id.
157 Basel Action Network v. Mar. Admin., 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 69 (D.D.C. 2005).
158 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
159 Id. at 2764.
160 Id. at 2766.
161 See id.
162 Id at 2771.
163 Id. at 2764.
164 Id. at 2764-65.
165 Verified Complaint, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278
(2012), (No. CIV-12-1000-HE), 2012 WL 4009450, ¶ 42.
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as they operate and manage Hobby Lobby and Mardel, do so, and
require their subordinates to do so, in a way that often furthers religious
objectives alongside profit-making objectives.166  For example, as the
Supreme Court noted, they do not operate on Sundays, they do not
“facilitate or promote alcohol use,” and they purchase proselytizing
advertisements in newspapers.167
Nevertheless, some valid religious purposes should not be sufficient to
override the profit-making form affirmatively chosen by the corporations
in Hobby Lobby.  The case law of the European mechanisms, namely the
case of Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB et al. v. Finland, offers instruc-
tive inspiration.168  A key inquiry for the European Court is whether the
corporate owners had an alternative to the for-profit corporate form for
pursuing their religious objects.169  Such alternatives were readily availa-
ble to the Hahns and the Greens in US law, who could have chosen to
join a church, or indeed set up their own non-profit religious organiza-
tion.  Had the Hobby Lobby case occurred in Europe, the European
Court would have agreed that some of the objects of Hobby Lobby, Mar-
del and Conestoga are religious, yet this would have been inconsequential
for obtaining associational standing, and the CHCs would not have been
able to invoke religious freedom.  Similarly, we argue, and US law
agrees,170 that ancillary religious objectives should not be sufficient to
override the corporations’ for-profit form and render the corporation a
conduit for its constituents’ (here, individual owners’) beliefs.
US case law clarifies that the exercise of religion should be germane to
the corporations’ purposes under the associational standing test.171  The
germaneness requirement presents a low threshold for associations to
meet.  Indeed, courts have created a very permissive rule, redefining
“germaneness” to mean only “pertinence.”172  However, the pertinence
requirement stems from the rationale for the associational relationship.
In UAW v. Brock, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he very forces that
cause individuals to band together in an association will thus provide
some guarantee that the association will work to promote their inter-
ests.”173  Based on that rationale, the pertinence test requires that “an
166 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2766.
167 Id.
168 Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB v. Finland, App. No. 20471/92, 1996 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 29, 40.
169 Id.
170 See Grote Indus. v. Sebelius, 914 F. Supp. 2d 943, 953 (S.D. Ind. 2012)
(emphasizing the importance of separating the business purpose of the employers,
and employers personal religious inclinations).
171 See, e.g., Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
172 Humane Soc’y of the United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 55-57 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
173 Brock, 477 U.S. at 290.
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organization’s litigation goals be pertinent to its special expertise and the
grounds that bring its membership together.”174
This interpretation raises two questions: why did the members of
Hobby Lobby, Conestoga and Mardel, respectively come together?
Relatedly, would a shareholder seeking to join one of these corporations
understand that the corporation’s policies would represent or further her
manifestation of religion?
On the other hand, religious organizations, which by definition include
a congregation brought together for the purpose of manifesting religion,
would generally satisfy the requirements for associational standing.  The
US for-profit corporation, with its legally separate entity, necessarily dis-
tinguishes between the individuals within the corporation, thereby mak-
ing it impossible to represent membership in a lawsuit.175  Meanwhile, a
non-profit organization is more likely to represent the views of its mem-
bers.  As Brandon Garrett explains:
[A] nonprofit religious organization, functioning in effect as an asso-
ciation, exists to permit religious exercise of members: as the Court
puts it, “[f]or many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in
large measure from participation in a larger religious community.”
For the Court to suggest that a for-profit company is no different
than a non-profit or an association or a religious entity, and that
these distinctions are “quite beside the point,” ignores the relevance
of the corporate form entirely.176
Instead the corporation can sue for its own interests using the organiza-
tional standing test; such interests could include maximization of profit,
or other corporate goals.  However, they cannot include rights that only a
natural person and non-profit organizations organized in order for indi-
viduals to collectively practice their religious beliefs can exercise because
those rights would not be a distinct corporate interest.  In other words,
extending the right to exercise religion in order “to protect the rights of
people, including shareholders, officers, and employees, who are associ-
ated with a corporation” requires associational standing, which cannot
apply in Hobby Lobby.
(ii) Third Party Standing
Third party standing doctrine puts a final nail in the coffin for the possi-
bility of Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga to have some form of
representational standing.  As amici curiae Free Speech for People,
Auburn Theological Seminary, and Hollender Sustainable Brands noted,
174 Humane Soc’y, 840 F.2d at 56 (emphasis added).
175 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
176 Garrett, supra note 143, at 145 (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
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there already exists a separate legal rationale for allowing corporations to
sue on behalf of their members — third party standing — which is much
more restrictive than associational standing.177  The general prohibition
on asserting the rights of others is premised on the fact that those who are
actually affected are best positioned to adjudicate their claims.  Third
party standing requires the person bringing the lawsuit to (1) have suf-
fered an “injury in fact” that gives him or her a “sufficiently concrete
interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute” and (2) have “a close
relation to the third party”; and (3) “some hindrance [must exist] to the
third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.”178
In order to allow Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga to assert relig-
ious exercise rights for the benefit of their owners, the Supreme Court
should have examined the corporations’ (lack of) fulfillment of the third
party standing requirements rather than ignoring the corporate form and
imputing the natural persons’ beliefs to the corporations.  The result
would have been unequivocal: the three corporations simply do not meet
the third party standing requirements.
It is clear from the judgment that such outcome seemed to pose a con-
ceptual quandary for the majority, because, in their view, the exclusion of
a for-profit corporation from exercising religion would create an inexplic-
able distinction between non-profits and for-profits where the Court has
already recognized that some non-profits can exercise religion.179  In fact,
a logical distinction exists in prior case law on associational standing, and
the quandary is rather that the Supreme Court ignored this.  Religious
non-profit organizations organized in order to collectively practice cer-
tain religious beliefs can have standing to assert the religious rights of
their members via associational standing while for-profit corporations,
which do not have even an informal membership scheme, cannot.180
II. LIMITATIONS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON BOTH SIDES
OF THE ATLANTIC
A. The ACA’s Contraceptive Mandate: Testing the Limits
Having determined that the corporations in Hobby Lobby are persons
under the RFRA, and can exercise religion, the Supreme Court then
examined the ACA’s effect on these corporations: whether it imposes a
substantial burden on the exercise of religion, whether it is in furtherance
of a compelling government interest, and whether it uses the least restric-
177 Brief for Free Speech for People et al., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v.
Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 13-356), 2014 WL 491372, at *19.
178 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (internal quotations omitted).
179 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769.
180 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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tive means to do so.181  These issues are of great importance for under-
scoring some of the socio-legal implications outlined in Section III of this
article.  Three key points should be mentioned with regard to the
Supreme Court’s examination of the ACA’s effects on religious
manifestations.
First, when the Court examined whether the law burdened the exercise
of religion, it considered and dismissed an argument that the requirement
to offer insurance coverage — which an employee may use to receive a
type of birth control that offends the corporations’ claimed religious
beliefs — was too attenuated to constitute a burden on religious exer-
cise.182  The government argued that the law only required insurance cov-
erage, which included the offending methods of birth control, and that
several intermediate steps would be required to actually burden the cor-
porations’ religious beliefs.183  Namely, the employee would have to
choose that insurance coverage and seek that medication.  These interme-
diate steps, according to the government, made the burden too attenu-
ated.184  Rather than engaging with this argument, the majority merely
stated that such an argument would require it to examine the reasonable-
ness of the parties’ beliefs.185  Longstanding jurisprudence holds that it is
not appropriate for courts to determine whether religious beliefs are rea-
sonable, only whether the parties sincerely hold such beliefs.186  How-
ever, the government’s claims did not require the Court to investigate the
reasonableness of the defendants’ beliefs, but instead to review the causal
link between the mandate and the purported harm.
Second, the fact that the Supreme Court decided the case under the
RFRA rather than the Free Exercise Clause187 has important conse-
quences for the standard of review.  The Free Exercise Clause requires a
law that has neutral applicability to only undergo rational basis review —
the government must show that the law is rationally related to an impor-
tant government interest.188  The RFRA on the other hand requires the
federal laws to undergo strict scrutiny review — the government must
show that there is a compelling government interest and the law utilizes
the least restrictive means in pursuing that interest.189
181 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767.
182 Id. at 2777-78.
183 Id. at 2777.
184 Id.
185 See id. at 2778.
186 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715
(1981)).
187 Under the constitutional avoidance doctrine, US courts will avoid deciding a
case on constitutional grounds if another ground (e.g. statutory, standing, ripeness)
will suffice. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936).
188 See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990).
189 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
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In fact, the Court considered at length the necessity of this strict scru-
tiny standard in free exercise cases in Hobby Lobby.  It examined a long
history of religious exercise challenges tied to the Free Exercise Clause
and determined that Congress intended the RFRA to depart from the
free exercise jurisprudence.190  Using the strict scrutiny required by the
RFRA, the Supreme Court then held that the contraceptive mandate in
the ACA was a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, but that it
was not the least restrictive means of pursuing the government’s inter-
est.191  The strict scrutiny standard becomes determinative for religious
exercise cases because the least restrictive means requirement is a very
high requirement to meet.  Thus, the presumption for a case decided
under the RFRA, and thus its application of strict scrutiny review, favors
individuals asserting their rights to exercise religion.192  Here, the
Supreme Court did not decide on whether the law served a compelling
government interest, the first prong of the strict scrutiny standard,
because it found that the law did not utilize the least restrictive means.
Third, the Supreme Court made an analogy between cases related to
taxation and Hobby Lobby, and the logical extension of such analogy
should have led the Court to dismiss the case for lack of standing.  It
never should have reached the stage of inquiring whether the contracep-
tive mandate represented the least restrictive means.  The Court used the
least restrictive means prong to distinguish Hobby Lobby from prior
cases that challenged federal taxes on religious exercise grounds.193  It
noted that there were no less restrictive means available to implement
federal taxes and that individual exemptions were not practical.194  In
Hobby Lobby, on the other hand, the government could provide insur-
ance directly or could extend already existing exemptions to corporations
whose owners hold conflicting religious beliefs.195  As noted above, the
ECHR mechanisms’ taxation cases were key in deciding to whom the
190 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2772.  The RFRA statute was enacted immediately
following a Supreme Court case, Employment Division v. Smith, which required
facially neutral laws to withstand the strict scrutiny test when challenged under the
free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.  The government
in Hobby Lobby argued that Congress passed the statute with the intent to restore
the law to the jurisprudence prior to Smith, but the Supreme Court determined that
Congress did not demonstrate such intent since it did not use language typically used
when tying a statutory interpretation to particular jurisprudence, its later amendments
used language inconsistent with that purpose, and it included a clause calling for a
broad interpretation of religious exercise — a goal that would be inconsistent with
narrowing the application to pre-Smith jurisprudence. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2772.
191 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 2784.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 2781-82.
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right of freedom of religion belongs.196  When examining challenges to
church taxes levied against for-profit entities, the fact that the petitioners
chose a for-profit model (and the availability of alternative models)
determined that the company was not exempt from the church tax.197  In
another case, a single shareholder of a for-profit corporation was not
exempt from a church tax on religious grounds, the Swiss Federal Tribu-
nal reasoned, because a corporate entity has separate obligations from
the individual owner.198
The Supreme Court, on the other hand distinguished tax cases in deter-
mining the permissible limitations on religious freedom.199  Yet, the
Court could have compared religious freedom and taxation when deter-
mining standing — who is able to assert the right to free exercise under
the RFRA.  Ginsburg noted in her dissent, relying on United States v.
Lee, that although owners may come together into a commercial enter-
prise with religious objectives, their beliefs cannot be imposed upon
others, such as their employees, through exemption from taxation.200
Thus, on the standing question, we posit that the corporate form required
a separate treatment of the corporations and the owners, and that the
Supreme Court should not have allowed the owners’ religious beliefs to
be imposed upon the corporations because, among other deficiencies,
they were not associations that represent a membership.201  If the Court
had undertaken the proper analysis in determining standing, it would
have dismissed the case and never needed to distinguish Hobby Lobby
from taxation cases in the substantive analysis.
B. “European” Limitations on Religious Freedom: On Veils and
Margins
Article 9(2) of the ECHR entails a limitation clause, which provides
that states can impose restrictions on religious exercise as long as they are
“prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society in the inter-
ests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”202  These pro-
visions therefore call in Article 9 cases for the European Court, and dur-
ing its existence the Commission, to first assess whether an interference
occurred and then to perform a balancing test that verifies whether the
state’s interference was prescribed by law, whether the interference pur-
196 See discussion supra Section I(B) and accompanying text.
197 Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB v. Finland, App. No. 20471/92, 1996 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 29, 39.
198 Bundesgerichts [BGer][Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 22, 2010, 2C.71/2010
(Switz.), http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr//bger/100922_2C_71-2010.html.
199 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784.
200 Id. at 2803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
201 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
202 ECHR, supra note 48, art. 9(2).
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sues a legitimate aim, and whether it was proportional to the aim.203
When the response to any of the three questions of the balancing test is
negative, the Court concludes that a violation of the Convention has
taken place.
As we have seen, the European Court takes an expansive view of the
definition of religion and its manifestations, and generally tends to side
with the case applicants (individuals, groups of individuals, and church-
like entities) in what constitutes an interference by the government.204
At the same time, due to the supranational nature of the European Court
and its sensitivity towards national legislatures, the Court rarely chal-
lenges a government’s aims as illegitimate.205  It allows the state some
discretion to make “the initial assessment” concerning “the reality of the
pressing social need implied by the notion of ‘necessity.’”206  Ultimately,
it is the proportionality of the interference with the sought aim that
becomes paramount in determining whether a violation of Article 9
occurred.
This test under Article 9(2) is certainly not a fail-safe approach: it has
produced some quite spectacularly controversial decisions in recent
years.207  A proportionality test can conceal an underlying evaluation of
the legitimacy, or reasonableness, of an applicant’s religious belief.208
While formally undertaking a proportionality test, European judges have
occasionally engaged in what they warned states to avoid — evaluating
the legitimacy of an applicant’s religious belief.209  This practice can be
particularly problematic when judges are unable to relate to or fully grasp
an applicant’s belief.210  One of the most important lessons that the Euro-
pean Court may draw from US jurisprudence is to avoid engaging in the
203 Id.
204 See Hasan & Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1339, ¶
78 (2000).
205 See Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 737, ¶ 48
(1976).
206 Id.
207 In particular, the jurisprudence of the European Court on religious symbols has
been criticized.  For a scholarly assessment, see JEROEN TEMPERMAN, THE LAUTSI
PAPERS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL CLASSROOM (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 2012).   For an activist
perspective, see European Court ruling on full-face veils punishes women for
expressing their beliefs, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (July 1, 2014), https://
www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/07/european-court-ruling-full-face-veils-
punishes-women-expressing-their-religion/.
208 Ioana Cismas, Whose Belief: the Plaintiff’s or the Judge’s? Strategies to Preserve
the Impartiality of Judicial Decisions in Cases Relating to Religion, EUROPEAN SOC’Y
INT’L L. RES. F. (May 2013) (on file with author).
209 See, e.g., Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001-V
(2001).
210 See id.
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evaluation of religious belief,211 whether in its assessment of whether an
interference occurred or concealed in the proportionality exercise — such
an approach may serve as a guarantee of impartiality.
In performing the proportionality test and deciding whether to allow a
wide or a narrow “margin of appreciation” to states, the Court searches
for a European consensus; in employing this doctrine, the Court reflects
its supranational position and recognizes a certain discretion to state par-
ties of the ECHR “in how they implement their obligations [flowing from
the Convention], taking into account their historical, social, political and
legal specificities.”212
For example, in S.A.S. v. France, a Muslim woman challenged a French
law that banned the wearing of a full-face veil and imposed criminal pen-
alties, as an infringement upon her Article 9 right to religious freedom.213
The Court’s inability to find a European consensus “as to whether or not
there should be a blanket ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public
places” led the Grand Chamber to accord a wide margin of appreciation
to the French authorities; this deference ultimately resulted in a finding of
a non-violation of the applicant’s Article 9 rights.214
The two dissenting judges noted that as only two out of forty-seven
member states of the Council of Europe opted for a full-face veil ban,
there was in fact a predominant consensus against a ban.215  In their view:
[T]he blanket ban could be interpreted as a sign of selective plural-
ism and restricted tolerance. . . . By banning the full-face veil, the
French legislature has . . . not sought to ensure tolerance between the
vast majority and the small minority, but has prohibited what is seen
as a cause of tension.216
The margin of appreciation doctrine, without further precautions,
presents a danger through wide applications, which allow the transposi-
tion of government and majoritarian preferences into court
interpretation.
Yet, proportionality remains an important test provided that the Court
seeks corrections for the European consensus (or lack thereof) acting as a
distorting factor in Article 9 cases; it can do this by prioritizing aspects
such as the intimate nature of the Convention right at issue in a particular
211 See Carolyn Evans & Anna Hood, Religious Autonomy and Labour Law: A
Comparison of the Jurisprudence of the United States and the European Court of
Human Rights, 1 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 81, 82 (2012).
212 Fre´de´ric Me´gret, “Nature of Obligations,” in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 104 (Moeckli, Shah, & Sivakumaran eds., 2014).
213 See S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145466.
214 Id. ¶ 156.
215 Id. ¶ 16 (dissent). See Uzma S. Burney, European Court of Human Rights
Upholds France’s Ban on the Full-Face Veil, 19 ASIL INSIGHTS 3 (2015).
216 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 14 (2013) (dissent).
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case and its importance for the individual,217 and by scrupulously avoid-
ing engaging in evaluations of an individual’s belief.  In other freedom of
religion cases, as discussed elsewhere, this doctrine provides better pro-
tection of individuals: it has limited the rights of churches and religious
organizations to impose religious beliefs and to impose on the rights of
religious employees as its aim was to strike a fairer balance between the
principle of church autonomy and individuals’ equality and labor
rights.218
C. Competing Rights: On Majorities and Minorities
The protection of religious exercise often implicates other individuals’
and groups’ rights and important public objectives.  As a result, both the
US and European systems permit limitations on religious exercise in cer-
tain circumstances.  Both the Supreme Court and the European Court
examine the extent of governments’ interference with religious exercise
to determine whether the restriction is legally permissible.
One can recall that the RFRA invoked the “strict scrutiny” standard,
which required the justices to answer three questions: (1) was there a
substantial burden imposed upon the corporation through the ACA man-
date; (2) was this burden in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (3) was this burden the least restrictive means to pursue
those aims.219  Similarly under the ECHR, the test involves four ques-
tions: (1) was there a limitation on the freedom to manifest religion; (2)
was the limitation prescribed by law; (3) was the limitation “necessary in
a democratic society” for the protection of various enumerated public
goals; and (4) was the limitation proportional to those goals.220
The first two questions in the US strict scrutiny standard parallel the
first three questions of the European Court’s test.  They examine govern-
mental limitations, burdens, or harms to religious exercise and the goals
such limitations are meant to further.  In Hobby Lobby, however, these
questions were not paramount in the Supreme Court’s interpretation.
The Supreme Court assumed that the corporations were substantially
burdened, in spite of strong arguments that any interference with the
owners’ religious exercise was so far removed as to not constitute a signif-
icant burden.221  The Supreme Court took as sincere the belief that such
contraceptives constituted abortion contrary to the owners’ religious
beliefs, but did not fully explore the impact of the contraceptive mandate
217 See Case of S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04,
Eur. Ct. H. R.  ¶ 102 (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-90051.
218 See Evans & Hood, supra note 211, at 94; Cismas, supra note 208, at 127-44.
219 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
220 ECHR, supra note 48, art. 9(2).
221 As noted above, the law merely required the corporations to offer the option
for employees to choose insurance which covered contraceptives. Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. at 2777-78.
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on those sincere beliefs.  In addition, the compelling government interest
that the ACA’s contraceptive mandate furthered — providing healthcare
to women — was never in question and therefore the Supreme Court did
not examine it thoroughly.
The last questions in the US and European tests diverge significantly
from each other.  The Supreme Court does not engage in a proportional-
ity test for RFRA claims.  Instead, US courts ask only whether the gov-
ernment action in question is the least restrictive possible way of
furthering the compelling government interest.222  A determinative part
of the decision in Hobby Lobby rested on the fact that the Supreme
Court envisioned alternative means of providing access to contraceptive
insurance that did not involve Hobby Lobby, Mardel, or Conestoga.223
The least restrictive means test, rather than a proportionality test, grants
a very narrow margin of appreciation to the US government or, a wide
one to the corporation in casu.
On the other hand, in certain recent cases related to religion, the Euro-
pean Court appears to engage in a proportionality test that grants a wide
margin of appreciation to governments and a narrow one to those assert-
ing the freedom to manifest religion.224  Such cases appear to involve
individuals from religious minorities, the paradigmatic illustration being
the veiled Muslim woman.225
Despite the differences in the tests applied by the Supreme Court and
the European Court, one commonality is striking: the outcome of both
limitation processes appears to prioritize the interests of the societally
powerful — whether, as in Hobby Lobby, it is the corporation that repre-
sents a minority of society but holds a majority of the power, or as in
S.A.S. v. France, the religious group that represents the majority of soci-
ety in both numbers and power.  And thus, the similar outcome also
appears to exacerbate the vulnerability of the vulnerable.  Another story
that emerges concerns the limitations of religious freedom rights, not of
corporations but of the employees of the three CHCs.  It is this story that
takes center-stage below.
III. IN THE AFTERMATH OF HOBBY LOBBY
That a court’s decision, in particular when such court is the US
Supreme Court, can have effects beyond the plaintiffs’ situation is not
uncommon.  Thus, while it similarly has broad consequences, what makes
Hobby Lobby extraordinary is the depth of the social and the breadth of
the legal consequences.
222 Id. at 2767.
223 Id. at 2759-60.
224 See generally S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 81, 83
(2013)
225 Id.
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A. Corporate Influence, the Sorting of Society and Polarization
By recognizing the right to exercise religion of CHCs, Hobby Lobby
ignores the potential diversity of religion among the natural persons who
comprise a corporation and exacerbates corporate influence226 at a socie-
tal level, which encourages the further polarization and ideological sort-
ing of business enterprises and discourages individuals’ participation in
society.  The Hobby Lobby decision allows corporations to exercise relig-
ious beliefs on behalf of the membership but at the same time ignores the
lack of voluntary association with religion by members of a for-profit cor-
poration.  As amici curiae Religious Organizations explain in their brief,
the US is a pluralistic society with a broad assortment of religions,227 and
a vast diversity of beliefs exists even among individuals ascribing to the
same religion.228  These variations are equally prevalent within work-
places, including corporations themselves.229
However, unlike religious organizations, corporations do not have the
affirmative purpose to associate as a group to manifest religion, generally
a specific prescribed doctrine.  On the contrary, corporate religious exer-
cise assumes homogeneous beliefs among the members of the corpora-
tion and forces the religious association onto members who may not
agree with it.230  Even the smallest corporation, comprised of only two
shareholders, could reveal divergent religious beliefs among the two
members.  Thus, attributing a particular belief to the corporation in grant-
ing standing to sue under the RFRA, US courts impose religious associa-
tions on the entire membership.
Such imposition, beyond being legally questionable, can lead to further
heightening the societal power of corporations in a time of arguably stag-
226 See generally DEAN BAKER, THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1980 221 (2007); see
also Inequality and Corporate Power, 24(5) MULTINATIONAL MONITOR 8, 9 (2003).
227 Brief of Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
12, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356),
2014 WL 333898 (citing PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS
LANDSCAPE SURVEY 2, 36 (2008), http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-
landscape-study-full.pdf).
228 Id. at 13 (citing PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, supra note 227, at 36). R
229 TANENBAUM CTR. FOR INTERRELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING, WHAT AMERICAN
WORKERS REALLY THINK ABOUT RELIGION: TANENBAUM’S 2013 SURVEY OF
AMERICAN WORKERS AND RELIGION 5 (2013), http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/
bpen-9b7pks/$File/2013TanenbaumWorkplaceAndReligionSurveyEmail.pdf.
230 After the US Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, Frances Hill put forth a similar argument in relation to stockholders who
purchase a corporation’s stock to make money without the intent of supporting
political expression or a particular candidate. Frances R. Hill, Nonparticipatory
Association and Compelled Political Speech: Consent as a Constitutional Principle in
the Wake of Citizens United, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 550, 551-52 (2011)
(referencing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876).
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gering corporate influence.231  There is a growing trend in the US for cor-
porations and other for-profit entities to influence the public dialogue on
social and political issues.232  In recent years, corporations have spent
unprecedented amounts on political contributions and lobbying efforts.233
Interestingly, a report by the Brennan Center released in January 2015
shows that, in the aftermath of Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-
mission,234 another landmark decision of the Supreme Court, election
spending, including by corporations, has soared.235
Increased corporate control over corporate membership — in the form
of religious exercise rights — coupled with corporations’ increased influ-
ence in the public sphere raises the danger of individuals sorting their
corporate associations based on their ideological beliefs.236  Social scien-
tists have already demonstrated the prevalence of ideological sorting in
231 See supra note 226. R
232 See, e.g., Bill Allison & Sarah Harkins, Fixed Fortunes: Biggest Corporate
Political Interests Spend Billions, Get Trillions, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Nov. 17, 2014),
https://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/11/17/fixed-fortunes-biggest-corporate-
political-interests-spend-billions-get-trillions/; Lee Drutman, How Corporate
Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2015), http://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-conquered-
american-democracy/390822/; Andre´s Martinez, How Big Business Plays Role As
Social Activist, S.D. UNION TRIB. (July 11, 2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.
com/news/2015/jul/11/big-business-plays-role-as-social-activist/ (arguing that increased
corporate influence on society can be beneficial).
233 See, e.g., Michael Beckel, Top U.S. Corporations Funneled $173 Million to
Political Nonprofits, CTR. FOR PUB. Integrity (Jan. 16, 2014), http://
www.publicintegrity.org/2014/01/16/14107/top-us-corporations-funneled-173-million-
political-nonprofits; IAN VANDEWALKER, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NEW
YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, ELECTION SPENDING 2014: OUTSIDE SPENDING
IN SENATE RACES SINCE CITIZENS UNITED 1 (2015); Allison & Harkins, supra note
232. R
234 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
235 “In the five years since [Citizens United], super PACs, corporations, labor
unions, and other outside groups have spent almost $2 billion targeting federal
elections.  That is about two-and-a-half times the total for the years between 1990 and
2008.  Outside spending almost tripled between the 2008 and 2012 presidential
elections, more than quadrupled between the 2006 and 2010 midterm elections, and
then almost doubled again between the 2010 and 2014 midterm elections.” DANIEL J.
WEINER, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE AT NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW, CITIZENS UNITED FIVE YEARS LATER 4 (2010).
236 While many commentators refer to this phenomenon as “polarization,” a more
precise term is “sorting.” Morris Fiorina, Americans Have Not Become More
Politically Polarized, WASH. POST (June 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/23/americans-have-not-become-more-politically-
polarized/.
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the US.237  Bill Bishop described this phenomenon in The Big Sort when
he analyzed presidential votes, geographic polls, and election results and
found that, over the last six decades as Americans have become more
geographically mobile, they have moved into areas with like-minded peo-
ple.238  They have geographically sorted themselves into groups according
to political beliefs.239
This sorting has implications beyond politics, in the area of religious
associational life, media, and consumer preferences.  An examination of
churches reveals political, racial, and economic sorting, as churches
attempt to increase membership within their communities.240  As a result,
the political views within church congregations were also very homogene-
ous.241  Ideological sorting also occurs with regard to individuals’ media
choices.  With the proliferation of cable and internet news sources, indi-
viduals are able to curate their news exposure according to political bias,
thereby limiting their exposure to news they do not like or news that is
related in a manner with which they disagree242 — they enclose them-
selves in an “echo-chamber.”243
Lest we forget, Hobby Lobby and the two other CHCs in the case are
businesses with customers — in addition to being the main actors in US
legal developments related to religious freedom.  As such, of great rele-
vance for understanding the possible consequences of Hobby Lobby is
evidence that demonstrates that Americans also sort themselves to some
degree in terms of their consumer preferences.244  According to a 2012
survey by the Public Religion Research Institute, when given a choice,
self-identified liberals are more likely to shop at Target than Walmart,
whereas conservatives are more likely to choose Walmart.245  A con-
237 See, e.g., Natalie Jomini Stroud, Polarization and Partisan Selective Exposure,
60 J. COMM. 556, 557 (2010).
238 BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT 43-50 (2008).
239 Id.
240 In reference to Christian congregations, see BISHOP, supra note 238, at 171-73.
241 Id. at 176-77.
242 Tom Price, Polarization in America, 24 CQ RESEARCHER 193, 198, 206-08
(2014).
243 See, e.g., Stroud, supra note 237, at 556-57; Nicholas DiFonzo, The Echo-
Chamber Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2011/04/21/barack-obama-and-the-psychology-of-the-birther-myth/
the-echo-chamber-effect.
244 We note that the studies that show consumer sorting do not address the cause
of such sorting, but merely the correlation between political and consumer
preferences.  It is likely that targeted marketing plays a large role in creating the type
of consumer sorting described.  Regardless of the cause of such sorting, the fact
remains that society is becoming increasingly segmented in a variety of categories.
See generally infra notes 245-46.
245 Polarized Holiday Shopping: Are you Target and Starbucks, or Wal-Mart and
Dunkin’ Donuts?, PUB. RELIGION RES. INST. (Dec. 19, 2013), http://publicreligion.org/
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sumer research firm found similar results between Trader Joe’s and
Whole Foods (both favored by Democrats) and Wal-Mart or Costco
(both favored by Republicans).246
An anecdote of a 2012 controversy involving fast food chain Chik-fil-A
illustrates how the political associations with corporations may affect con-
sumer spending.  The controversy erupted when Chik-fil-A’s Baptist
owner spoke out against same-sex marriage and news broke that the com-
pany had donated large sums to anti-gay marriage causes.247  Many who
disagreed with the action boycotted the chain, while others who sup-
ported the owner’s anti-gay sentiments, including Republican presidential
hopeful Mike Huckabee, promoted “Chik-fil-A appreciation day” and
encouraged others to eat there.248
Sorting and societal polarization are related because increased ideolog-
ical sorting exposes individuals to a narrower range of beliefs, which may
in turn encourage gradual polarization to more extreme beliefs.249
According to one scholar, “there are hundreds of group polarization
experiments, all finding that like-minded groups, over time, grow more
extreme in the direction of the majority view.”250  A 2014 Pew Research
study shows a widening gap in political beliefs (from liberal to conserva-
tive) in the median beliefs of Democrats and Republicans from 1994 to
2014.251  The survey further found that individuals held more consistently
liberal or conservative beliefs (whereas previously they would have more
diverse views on different issues)252 and an increased animosity toward
the opposing political party.253
2013/12/polarized-holiday-shopping-are-you-target-and-starbucks-or-wal-mart-and-
dunkin-donuts/.
246 Reid Wilson, You Are Where You Shop: What Your Grocery Store Says About
You, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/
2013/12/09/you-are-where-you-shop-what-your-grocery-store-says-about-you/
?hpid=Z5.
247 Kim Severson, Chick-fil-A Thrust Back Into Spotlight on Gay Rights, N.Y.
TIMES (July 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/26/us/gay-rights-uproar-over-
chick-fil-a-widens.html.
248 Id.
249 Alan Abramowitz & Morris Fiorina, Polarized or Sorted? Just What’s Wrong
With Our Politics, Anyway?, THE AM. INTEREST (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.the-
american-interest.com/2013/03/11/polarized-or-sorted-just-whats-wrong-with-our-
politics-anyway/.
250 BISHOP, supra note 238, at 67; see also Stroud, supra note 237, at 569.
251 Nate Cohn, Polarization Is Dividing American Society, Not Just Politics, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/upshot/polarization-is-
dividing-american-society-not-just-politics.html?abt=0002&abg=1&_r=0.
252 Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public/.
253 Id.
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The current trends in ideological sorting and polarization may worsen
in the wake of the Hobby Lobby ruling.  We use the term ideological
sorting here to include both political and religious sorting, because of the
ease with which corporations may use religion as a pretext for other
beliefs.  Because courts will not evaluate the reasonableness of religious
beliefs (and rightly so), only their sincerity (and they seem to be very
lackadaisical in assessing sincerity), the door remains open for corpora-
tions to pursue a variety of agendas under the guise of “religious” beliefs.
After Hobby Lobby, corporations can exert increased influence by
asserting their rights to exercise religion in order to opt out of laws.  Cor-
porations’ further increased influence may encourage potential share-
holders and employees to choose their investments and employers,
respectively, according to the shareholders’ and employees’ religious and
political beliefs.254   These choices would operate as a more conscious
form of the ideological sorting that already occurs.  Meanwhile, those
individuals who are unable to choose their employment, expenditures, or
other associations with corporations according their religion will be
forced — through their corporate associations — to promote religious
beliefs to which they may not ascribe.
That the above scenario is all too real can be grasped from the conse-
quences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United.255  In the
aftermath of that judgment, members of corporations, including share-
holders and employees, have criticized that the corporations with which
they are associated have spent money on political causes contrary to the
shareholders’ and employees’ views and that these individuals have no
way to limit or control their support of such causes.256  Similar results
seem probable when for-profit corporations without a religiously con-
vened membership attempt to exercise religion.  In some cases, such
forced promotion of religious beliefs will drastically interfere with the
individual’s own human rights, such as through the loss of necessary
healthcare benefits.  These results will be discussed in greater detail.
Beforehand, it is interesting to parallel the situation in the US with that
in Europe.  The European Court’s practice of according a wide margin of
appreciation to states in manifestation of religion claims (the counterpart
in the European Court to free exercise claims in the US) preserves
facially neutral rules, which in turn tend to support majoritarian views.257
As dissenting judges in S.A.S. v. France258 and scholars before have
254 Again, we include political beliefs here because religious beliefs could easily be
used as a proxy for political beliefs. See id.
255 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 973.
256 WEINER, supra note 235, at 2.
257 S.A.S. v. France, App. No. 43835/11, ¶ 14 (dissent).
258 Id. ¶ 16.
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argued,259 this approach serves to hide the cause of societal conflict, as
opposed to addressing and solving existing tension.  One may compare
this consequence to that in the US: while US case law granting religious
rights to corporations risks increasing polarization, sorting, and corporate
power, the European Court’s case law granting a wide margin of appreci-
ation for states risks legitimizing the majority’s views and obscuring the
minority’s.  This practice seems to be a dangerous path given the rising
nationalism in various European countries.260
B. Losing the Balance: Women, Employees and “Targeted” Groups
We now turn to those most obviously affected in the aftermath of
Hobby Lobby: women, employees (but not just employees who are
women), and minorities who may be the targets of discrimination in the
future.  The most direct repercussion of the Hobby Lobby decision is that
it limits corporate insurance access for women employees of CHCs.  To
be clear, the majority’s decision has the direct effect of denying Hobby
Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga’s employees’ corporate insurance access
to certain forms of birth control, but that will not necessarily be Hobby
Lobby’s long-term legacy.261
The Supreme Court found that the contraceptive mandate of the ACA
violated the RFRA because the government had a less restrictive means
of ensuring women’s access to birth control: either through direct govern-
ment payment or through government sponsored exchanges that it had
already made available to religious organizations who objected to the
law.262  Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga’s employees’ access con-
traceptive insurance coverage may be restored when the government
implements a less restrictive alternative.
Despite some hope for future government intervention, the immediate
effects are vast.  The decision has the potential to affect female employ-
ees of Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and Conestoga as well as the employees’
spouses and dependents.  Moreover, the decision immediately affects the
259 Steven Wheatley, for instance has observed that European Court “has
recognised the legitimacy of claims by minorities to distinctiveness in the face of
cultural homogeneity but abrogated any responsibility to intervene in majority/
minority disputes.” Steven Wheatley, Minorities under ECHR and the Construction of
a “Democratic Society,” 4 PUB. L. 770, 771 (2007); see also Stephanie E. Berry, A Tale
of Two Instruments: Religious Minorities and the Council of Europe’s Rights Regime,
30 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. R. 1, 10 (2012).
260 See, e.g., Myles Udland, There’s a New Political Risk Looming in Europe, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 6, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/european-nationalism-risk-
2015-9; Luke Baker & Stephen Adler, “Nationalism and Xenophobia” on Rise Ahead
of European Elections, REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
10/30/us-eu-parliament-elections-idUSBRE99T0YZ20131030.
261 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775, 2782.
262 Id.
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employees of eighty-two other CHCs that had pending challenges to the
ACA’s contraceptive mandate.263  The decision has the further potential
to affect healthcare access for all other CHCs’ employees if their owners
object to the law, and, as mentioned above, there is no logical legal ratio-
nale that would keep this decision from applying to other forms of for-
profit corporations.264
The Supreme Court’s decision substantively diminishes women’s access
to necessary healthcare.  Most visibly, it affects access to birth control
when there are no alternatives to the four challenged forms, whereby two
of the challenged forms are the most effective options of non-permanent
birth control; as such, an equivalent alternative does not exist.265  Even in
situations where other forms of birth control could be appropriate, the
Hobby Lobby judgment enables the employer to limit the options, rather
than leaving the personal and medical decision to the woman and her
doctor.266  This restriction in choices has significant effects for reproduc-
tive rights and for healthcare more generally: it relocates the decision-
making nexus away from those who are in the best position to make the
decision and disempowers them.
Aside from reproductive healthcare and agency over its provision of
being a right in itself, the related societal effects are vast, as limitations in
this area are intrinsically linked with access to other rights.  The Supreme
Court itself highlighted in Planned Parenthood v. Casey that “[t]he ability
of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives.”267
Furthermore, various religious beliefs could impose restrictions on a
wide variety of other healthcare approaches.  The dissent pondered
whether the majority would extend its ruling in cases involving “relig-
iously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses);
antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived from pigs, including
anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Mus-
lims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among
263 Abby Haglage, After Hobby Lobby, These 82 Corporations Could Drop Birth
Control Coverage, THE DAILY BEAST (June 30, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2014/06/30/after-hobby-lobby-these-77-corporations-will-drop-birth-control-
coverage.html; see also Jaeah Lee, It’s Not Just Hobby Lobby: These 71 Companies
Don’t Want to Cover Your Birth Control Either, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 2, 2014), http://
www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/hobby-lobby-sebelius-contraceptive-for-
profit-lawsuits#cases.
264 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
265 Id. at 2800.
266 See id. at 2799.
267 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992).
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others).”  The majority did not offer a convincing logical distinction to
eliminate that worry.268
While ignoring the discriminating effects on women in the form of
healthcare inequality, the Hobby Lobby decision has the potential of
sanctioning wider practices of discrimination against other groups in the
name of religion.  Even before the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hobby
Lobby, the case has been rhetorically tied to discussions on lesbian, gay,
bi-sexual, transgender, and queer (“LGBTQ”) rights.269  Many of the
more vocal opponents of LGBTQ rights voice their opposition using
religious grounds.
In particular, several recent cases have involved storeowners who
refused to provide their services to gay customers on religious grounds.
In Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock (“Elane Photography”), a New
Mexico photography company refused to photograph a commitment cer-
emony between two women.270  The New Mexico Supreme Court deter-
mined that the company unlawfully discriminated against the couple
pursuant to the New Mexico Human Rights Act, despite the religious
nature of the owner’s objections, because the company sold its photogra-
phy services to the general public.271  The Supreme Court denied certio-
rari to review the decision in April of 2014, just months before the Hobby
Lobby decision.272
In the aftermath of Hobby Lobby, Terri Day, Leticia Diaz, and Dani-
elle Weatherby argue that Elane Photography and numerous cases filed
since represent a “growing trend in which for-profit businesses are invok-
ing their deeply held religious beliefs to excuse themselves from serving
gay and lesbian customers” as well as an example of the potential slippery
slope for the religious exercise protections the Supreme Court recognized
in Hobby Lobby.273  This trend even extends to government employees.
For example, in September 2015, County Clerk Kim Davis, of Rowan,
Kentucky, cited her religious beliefs when she refused to issue marriage
licenses to same-sex couples.274  Moreover, Day, Diaz, and Weatherby
268 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
269 We use this term in an effort to describe groups of people who are commonly
the subjects of discrimination, in particular trying to encompass much of the
discrimination that is most apparent in the wake of Hobby Lobby, but note that the
term does not represent a homogeneous community with singular issues and values.
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note that numerous states have enacted state-level RFRA laws that
“essentially grant religious employers a waiver from complying with state
public accommodations laws.”275  These trends threaten to sanction relig-
ious exercise claims as a pretext to discriminate against LGBTQ individu-
als, and the Hobby Lobby decision, in recognizing corporate religious
exercise rights even where such rights negatively impact individuals,
opens the door wider for such claims to move forward.
Traditionally, the limits of religious exercise in the US can be under-
stood by the oft-quoted saying, “[y]our right to swing your arms ends just
where the other man’s nose begins.”276  However, because the Supreme
Court decided Hobby Lobby using the strict scrutiny standard, the deci-
sion did not rest on the harmful effects the exemption would have on
employees.277  Instead, it rested on the level of government intrusion into
the corporations’ operations.278  Because US law requires the govern-
ment to use the least restrictive means, it promotes individual (or corpo-
rate) autonomy over the protection of other rights.279  In Hobby Lobby,
the test favored corporations at the expense of women and employees
and their access to healthcare.  In the future, it risks favoring corpora-
tions at the expense of promoting discrimination against other groups.
CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, many will agree that Hobby Lobby’s most remarkable leg-
acy may not be in the area of arts and crafts, but in that of US law.  Since
the Supreme Court’s holding, we have a new right holder of freedom of
religion: the for-profit corporation.  This, in and of itself, is extraordinary
— at a metaphysical level.  As this article has argued, recognizing the
freedom of religion of corporations will have negative legal consequences
on the reproductive and healthcare rights of certain groups of individuals
in casu and beyond (women, employees).  It will likely legitimize discrim-
inatory conduct by corporations towards LGBTQ individuals and deepen
societal repercussions in the form of ideological sorting and polarization.
We have demonstrated that the Supreme Court decision is misguided
in its approach (or lack thereof) to the corporate form, standing, and to a
certain extent, limitations on religious freedom.  It sidesteps a rich body
of case law on corporate form that would recognize the separation of the
corporate entity from its officers.  Instead, it confers the owner’s beliefs
onto the corporation itself, a tactic that would be useful under the associ-
ational standing doctrine but would not apply to Hobby Lobby.  In addi-
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tion to its misguided conclusion on whose right is the free exercise of
religion, the standard the Supreme Court uses to determine when the free
exercise of religion can be limited under the RFRA overwhelmingly
favors those claiming the rights.
Alternative ways in US law were available, and inspiration from the
European Court could have provided valuable insights for an alternative
model.  These alternatives include a distinction between non-profit and
for-profit enterprises and a recognition that only corporations whose
membership came together for the purpose of exercising religion — in
other words associations — should be able to assert religious beliefs on
behalf of their membership.
Nevertheless, the European model has its own problems of favoring
majoritarian views on religion at the expense of individual religious lib-
erty.  Thus, our question of who’s right, the Supreme Court versus the
European Court, does not have a clear-cut answer.  While the Supreme
Court should have denied corporate freedom of religion, the European
model goes too far in the opposite direction.  In particular in the area of
limitations on religious rights, both courts’ recent bodies of jurisprudence
favor societally powerful groups.  In the US, that jurisprudence serves to
entrench the privileges of increasingly powerful corporations, while in
Europe it serves to fortify majoritarian interests.
Going forward, the Supreme Court may insist on restricting freedom of
religion to the specific case of CHCs.  However, this restriction seems to
us legally untenable.  Sole proprietorship would have a stronger case to
make based on the reasoning in Hobby Lobby.  The sound alternative is
to revisit Hobby Lobby and return to the precedent of for-profit corpo-
rate religious freedom.  Given that some corporations will feel legitimized
to discriminate against LGBTQ individuals in the name of religious free-
dom, the Supreme Court may have such an opportunity in the not so
distant future.  This opportunity may be the most ironic consequence of
Hobby Lobby as the Court will have to address head-on the two critical
questions of contemporary times and conclude that corporate rights come
with responsibilities and that the state must protect individuals from
religious interference, even when such interference is exerted by
corporations.
